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ABSTRACT: The health reform law boosted Medicare fees for primary care ambulatory 
visits by 10 percent for five years starting in 2011. Using a simulation model with real-
world parameters, we evaluate the effects of a permanent 10 percent increase in these fees. 
Our analysis shows the fee increase would increase primary care visits by 8.8 percent, and 
raise the overall cost of primary care visits by 17 percent. However, these increases would 
yield more than a sixfold annual return in lower Medicare costs for other services—mostly 
inpatient and postacute care—once the full effects on treatment patterns are realized. The 
net result would be a drop in Medicare costs of nearly 2 percent. These findings suggest 
that, under reasonable assumptions, promoting primary care can help bend the Medicare 
cost curve.
            
OVERVIEW
Among provisions in the Affordable Care Act of 2010 is a temporary, five-year, 
10 percent increase in Medicare payments for primary care services. The law 
defines these services as office and other ambulatory visits furnished by primary 
care physicians (PCPs)—including family practice physicians, general internists, 
geriatricians, and pediatricians—as well as nurse practitioners, clinical nurse 
specialists, and physician assistants. For practitioners to qualify for these higher 
payments, at least 60 percent of their Medicare-allowed charges in a prior period 
must be for primary care services.1
Congress intended this provision, along with others in the law, to reori-
ent health care delivery toward more primary care by providing primary care 
practices with new resources. In this issue brief, we use a simulation model with 
empirically based parameters to assess this underlying assumption in the context 
of a permanent increase in payments for primary care.
Although legislators originally included the fee increase as a permanent 
budget-neutral provision, offset by fee cuts to other physicians, opposition by 
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specialist groups killed the budget-neutrality compo-
nent. Instead, Congress made the provision temporary 
to keep the legislation’s estimated costs—as scored by 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)—in line with 
the Obama administration’s spending target.
While many legislators may have assumed 
that the temporary fee increase would become perma-
nent (like other temporary changes to fee schedules), 
whether medical practitioners make this assumption is 
less clear. If they perceive the increase as temporary—
which is likely, given the current political emphasis on 
deficit reduction—the provision will be less effective 
in achieving its goals. By itself, a five-year, relatively 
modest fee increase is unlikely to influence medical 
students to pursue careers in primary care. Nor is a 
temporary increase likely to affect primary care provid-
ers’ business decisions to invest in practice changes, 
such as by adopting health information technology 
or hiring “physician extenders,” who include nurse 
practitioners and physician assistants. A temporary fee 
increase is also less likely to spur PCPs to devote more 
time to evaluation and management (E&M) services 
rather than more lucrative services such as diagnostic 
tests and procedures.
The CBO score for the modest fee increase 
(along with a similar temporary fee increase for gen-
eral surgeons practicing in health professional shortage 
areas, contained in the same section of the Affordable 
Care Act) showed that Medicare spending would rise 
by $3.5 billion from 2010 to 2019, with most of the 
increase occurring from 2011 to 2015. This finding 
presumably reflected limited provider responses to the 
temporary provision. It is unclear whether the CBO 
would have scored a permanent fee increase as a cost 
saver, although the agency has a history of underesti-
mating savings from Medicare payment reforms.2
We used a simulation model to predict the 
long-run annual budgetary impact of a permanent 
increase in primary care fees, to allow medical markets 
time to fully adapt to it.3 Simulation models use behav-
ioral relationships estimated using available data to 
predict the effects of proposed policies, where observa-
tional data on comparable policies in similar contexts 
is not available. This approach is widely used by state 
and federal governments to help officials formulate 
policy both inside and outside the health arena.
Our model shows that a modest but permanent 
10 percent increase in fees for primary care visits would 
boost the use of E&M services in primary care. And 
that, in turn, would reduce total Medicare spending 
by nearly 2 percent per year in the long run—mainly 
because of reductions in hospitalizations, outpatient ser-
vices, and postacute care. Those savings would signifi-
cantly offset the extra funds allocated to primary care.
BACKGROUND
The 10 percent fee increase was only one of a set of 
Affordable Care Act provisions intended to support 
and expand primary care. Among other provisions, the 
law also provides for a two-year increase in payments 
for primary care physicians treating Medicaid patients, 
and offers incentives for teaching hospitals to produce 
more primary care physicians, and for medical students 
to enter primary care specialties. The law also funds 
demonstrations of reforms to health care delivery and 
payment systems oriented toward primary care, such as 
patient-centered medical homes.
Over the past decade, Medicare fees and 
spending for specialist services—particularly ancillary 
services such as diagnostic tests and procedures—have 
risen far more rapidly than fees and spending for E&M 
services, which PCPs typically provide. Those higher 
payments have contributed to faster growth in special-
ist services than in E&M patient visits.4 And com-
mercial insurers and state Medicaid plans often build 
their fee schedules on Medicare’s, further widening the 
income gap between PCPs and other physician special-
ists, and contributing to the shrinking number of medi-
cal students choosing to enter primary care.5
The Medicare fee schedule’s low valuation of 
E&M visits—the bread and butter of primary care—
relative to ancillary services may have also encouraged 
PCPs to alter their mix of services away from E&M 
and toward more imaging, other diagnostic testing, and 
minor procedures, as evidenced by surprisingly high 
rates of ownership by PCP practices of equipment for 
these services.6 These trends—along with anticipated 
rapid growth in demand for primary care arising from 
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expanded insurance coverage under the Affordable 
Care Act, and the aging of the population—have many 
concerned that the nation faces a looming shortage of 
primary care providers.7
Can paying more for primary care end up saving 
the entire Medicare program money? Hadley et al. found 
that higher Medicare fees for specific services, including 
office-based E&M, spur more provision of these ser-
vices to Medicare patients.8 In a recent literature review, 
Friedberg, Hussey, and Schneider found that the major-
ity of evidence points to the benefits of primary care, 
including its potential to lower costs.9 Primary care does 
so by detecting disease earlier, substituting less-costly 
care for more expensive specialist services, providing 
greater coordination of care and less duplication of ser-
vices, and reducing preventable hospitalizations.
No studies specifically relate relative payments 
for primary care versus other services to costs or out-
comes. However, compelling evidence suggests the ben-
efits of delivery systems that emphasize primary care, 
such the patient-centered medical home and the Chronic 
Care Model, which encourages consistent care for 
chronic diseases such as diabetes. To reorient the health 
care system toward primary care, Friedberg, Hussey, and 
Schneider cite payment reforms—including those that 
narrow the disparity between E&M services and tests 
and procedures—as an important component.
How This Study Was Conducted
Our simulation aimed to measure the impact of raising 
rates for ambulatory E&M visits by primary care pro-
viders relative to rates for other services, in isolation 
from other components of health care reform and over-
all changes to the Medicare fee schedule. Our model 
provides two sets of projections: a “baseline” projec-
tion that assumes no extra fee increase for primary care 
relative to other services, and a “policy” projection 
that incorporates the 10 percent fee increase for pri-
mary care E&M visits. Reflecting the Affordable Care 
Act, we assumed that the 10 percent fee increase for 
primary care visits took effect in January 2011, with 
annual updates in later years equal to those assigned to 
other physician services. (Data constraints prevented 
us from replicating the Medicare criterion that only 
practices with 60 percent primary care services in the 
prior year qualify for higher payments.)
We used the simulation to estimate the long-
run response in services and spending to a change in 
fees. Our model does not identify the precise mecha-
nisms by which the supply of primary care E&M visits 
changes (such as by spurring changes in the number 
of providers, or the use of physician extenders), or the 
length of time needed to fully realize those effects. 
However, we did assume that the full impact of the 
policy occurs by 2020, and, for convenience, that the 
percentage growth in service use is constant over this 
10-year period. 
Our model uses three years of paid Medicare 
claims for some 2.7 million beneficiaries age 65 
and older enrolled in the traditional fee-for-service 
program who did not have end-stage renal disease 
(ESRD).10 These elders had at least one contact from 
2004 to 2006 with any of 5,554 physicians who treated 
Medicare patients and responded to the 2004–2005 
Community Tracking Study (CTS) Physician Survey, 
conducted by the Center for Studying Health System 
Change. The CTS Physician Survey uses a sample 
that is representative of nonfederal physicians practic-
ing in the continental United States who provide 20 or 
more hours of direct patient care per week. The sample 
includes respondents from 60 nationally representative 
communities. The beneficiary sample linked to physi-
cians was weighted to be nationally representative. 
We used the 2004–2006 claims data set to predict the 
growth in nonphysician service categories over time.
We standardized Medicare costs mostly by 
assigning a national average cost to each service—rep-
resenting total allowed charges (payments that providers 
received from Medicare, patients, and other insurers). 
Those costs were constructed to be independent of the 
geographic location where services were provided, 
whether providers received extra payments intended 
to further other social goals (extra payments to teach-
ing hospitals, for example), and the method of payment 
within a class of providers (such as cost-based reimburse-
ment for critical-access hospitals, versus prospective pay-
ments for diagnosis-related groups for other hospitals).
We supplemented these claims data with 
another linked CTS Physician Survey–Medicare data 
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Costs of primary care evaluation and management visits per Medicare beneciary
 2010  2012  2014  2016  2018  2020
Total nondrug medical costs per Medicare beneciary
Baseline
$613 (+17%)
$570 (+8.8%)
$524
10% fee
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fee quantity)
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$359
Exhibit 1. Impact of a 10% Increase in Medicare Fees for Primary Care Visits on the Cost of Primary Care 
and Total Per-Benecary Costs, 2010–2020 (2010 dollars)
Note: Top gure: The medium blue line includes rising costs stemming from more visits per beneciary, which result from a 10% increase in fees to primary care 
providers. (This line does not include the actual cost of the higher fees.) The dark blue line includes the cost of the higher fees. All costs include allowed charges 
by providers paid by Medicare, other insurers, and patients.
Source: HSC-CMWF Medicare Simulation Model.
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set with claims from 2000 and 2005. We used this data 
set to estimate how physicians would respond to higher 
fees for primary care and other physician services.
For more complete accounts of how we con-
ducted this study, see the Appendix on page 10, or an 
even more detailed account in a technical appendix 
available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/
media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2012/Mar/
Reschovsky_technical_appendices_FINAL.pdf.
WHAT OUR MODEL SHOWS: OVERALL 
COST SAVINGS
Our simulation finds that raising fees for primary care 
ambulatory E&M visits will increase the use and cost 
of these visits but will lower overall Medicare costs 
(Exhibit 1). Under our baseline scenario, the average 
annual cost per beneficiary of primary care E&M visits 
in ambulatory settings is projected to rise 46 percent by 
2020, from an annual base of $359 per beneficiary in 
2010 (in 2010 dollars).
Predictions from the two-part primary care 
supply equations estimated for the model (not shown) 
suggest that higher primary care fees increase both the 
likelihood that PCPs will treat Medicare beneficiaries 
and, more importantly, the quantity of E&M services 
PCPs provide to Medicare patients. Higher fees for 
primary care beginning in 2011 increase the number 
of primary care visits by less than one visit per benefi-
ciary, raising the cost of primary care by 8.8 percent. If 
we factor in the cost of the 10 percent increase in reim-
bursement, the total per-beneficiary cost for primary 
care services under the policy scenario is 17 percent 
higher than under the baseline scenario.
However, although the cost of primary care 
visits rises relative to the baseline, this cost represents 
only about 2 percent of total Medicare costs. Our pro-
jections show that total per-beneficiary costs—which 
include primary care and all other costs—decline 1.9 
percent in the long run. That is because cost savings 
from reduced use of other services are more than six 
times the added costs of more E&M visits per benefi-
ciary and higher payments per E&M visit according 
to the model.11 That means savings for the Medicare 
program, beneficiaries, and supplemental insurers, 
although Medicare would reap the large majority of 
those savings. 
Sources of the Cost Savings
Exhibit 2 breaks down these significant cost savings 
by spending category. For ease of presentation, we 
combined some smaller Medicare Part B spending 
categories, as well as other closely related categories, 
reducing 19 spending categories to 12.
Primary care E&M services can substitute for 
other services or complement them. For instance, we 
estimate that the costs of other E&M visits—inpatient 
visits and outpatient visits provided by specialists—
will decline by 3.6 percent, but that the overall costs of 
imaging and other diagnostic tests will rise. The costs 
of minor and major procedures are projected to decline 
slightly. Other Part B costs are projected to rise by 
more than 4 percent.
Most cost savings are achieved through lower 
predicted use of hospital care and associated postacute 
care. The cost per beneficiary of hospital outpatient 
care—including emergency department services not 
resulting in admission—also drops. Baseline inpa-
tient costs alone account for over 40 percent of total 
Medicare costs, and we project the primary care fee 
increase to reduce these costs by around 4 percent rela-
tive to the baseline projection. Consistent with this 
decrease in inpatient costs, we see a 3.6 percent drop 
in costs for the use of skilled nursing facilities, and a 
3.5 percent drop in costs for the use of home health and 
hospice services. Hospital outpatient costs also decline 
by about 4.6 percent relative to baseline.
The precise savings stemming from these effects 
are uncertain, as they rest on assumptions concerning 
future cost trends and other factors. However, the impact 
of greater provision of E&M services by primary care 
providers in lowering total costs persisted when we con-
ducted a series of sensitivity analyses (see Appendix).
IMPLICATIONS OF OUR FINDINGS
Our results suggest that even a modest permanent 
increase in payments for ambulatory E&M visits to pri-
mary care physicians could reduce the rate of growth 
in Medicare spending by increasing the provision of 
6 the commonwealth FunD
E&M services by primary care providers. Over time, 
significant cost savings accrue from reduced hospital 
inpatient and outpatient care as well as postacute care.
While we can only speculate on the underly-
ing mechanisms that might be driving our findings, 
the most logical explanation is that more primary care 
can prevent ambulatory care–sensitive conditions from 
getting worse, preventing hospitalizations, emergency 
room visits, and outpatient procedures, or reducing 
the severity of cases when inpatient care is required. 
Savings in postacute care follow from fewer and less-
severe hospitalizations.
Roughly 5 percent of Medicare beneficiaries are 
hospitalized for at least one ambulatory care–sensitive 
condition each year.12 A typical hospitalization prevented 
would offset the cost of many primary care E&M visits.
Reductions in other physician visits stemming 
from higher payments for primary care yield smaller 
overall cost savings, according to our simulation. Some 
of these savings might reflect fewer visits to hospitalized 
patients by primary care physicians, hospitalists, or spe-
cialist physicians. Devoting more resources to primary 
care visits could also alter the clinical threshold beyond 
which primary care physicians refer patients to special-
ists. Improved outcomes from greater primary care 
could also reduce the need for specialist care. All these 
findings suggest that raising fees for primary care could 
lead to better clinical outcomes as well as lower costs. 
Should Medicare Extend Higher Fees to 
Specialists Who Provide Primary Care?
If increasing fees for primary care physicians who 
provide E&M services reduces total costs, might 
extending higher reimbursements to specialists who 
provide primary care services have a similar impact? 
Measuring that effect presents practical difficulties. 
Primary care and specialist physicians often treat the 
same conditions, and determining whether a patient is 
Exhibit 2. Impact of Increase in Fees for Primary Care E&M Visits,  
by Type of Service, in 2020
Service category
Predicted baseline 
standardized costs 
per beneficiarya
Percent of 
total baseline 
costs
Percentage 
change relative 
to baseline 
Primary care E&M visits $524 2.1%
Cost increase from more visitsb — — 8.8%
Cost increase from 10% fee increaseb — — 8.2
Other E&M visits 1,682 6.8 -3.6
Other Medicare Part B services 1,478 5.9 4.1
Imaging 1,296 5.2 2.1
Diagnostic tests 346 1.4 5.0
Minor procedures 691 2.8 –0.6
Major procedures 1,239 5.0 –0.4
Part B drugs 1,028 4.1 4.2
Hospital outpatient 1,832 7.4 –4.6
Inpatient care 10,016 40.3 –4.0
Skilled nursing facilities 3,027 12.2 –3.6
Home health and hospice 1,688 6.8 –3.5
Totalb $24,847 100.0% –1.9%
a In 2010 dollars. 
b Cost increases from the two components of primary care visits total $89 per beneficiary. However, total costs—including the 
increases in the cost of primary care—drop $482 relative to the baseline prediction. 
Source: HSC-CMWF Medicare Simulation Model.
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best served by a primary care physician or a specialist 
is difficult. What’s more, both primary care and spe-
cialist physicians use the same visit codes and other 
codes to bill Medicare, so determining whether ser-
vices provided by a specialist were specialist care or 
primary care is challenging and subject to abuse.
There is a large, inconsistent, and often meth-
odologically flawed literature comparing the quality 
of care provided by primary care and specialist physi-
cians for given conditions. Most studies have found 
that specialists who manage conditions within their 
domain do a better job than do primary care physi-
cians.13 However, for conditions outside their specific 
domain, specialists are likely to provide inferior pri-
mary care compared with PCPs. Thus the impact on 
total costs of extending higher fees for primary care 
services to specialists is uncertain.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the current political climate is not conducive 
to policies that appear to increase entitlement spend-
ing, our results show that Congress should make the 
10 percent increase in fees for primary care permanent 
now. Such an increase is projected to help bend the 
Medicare cost curve in coming years.
More broadly, our results endorse the wide array 
of provisions in the Affordable Care Act and other pol-
icy proposals that aim to reorient the health care delivery 
system to provide more primary care. As an example 
of the latter, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services is more aggressively striving to reduce the 
number of “relative value units” assigned to “over-
valued” services, which will increase the payment for 
historically undervalued primary care services.14 Such 
administrative adjustments can have the same impact as 
legislated increases in payments for primary care.
As with any simulation model, our analysis 
has limitations. Models abstract a complex world and 
rely on estimates of behavioral responses and various 
assumptions. For example, our model is static, mean-
ing that we do not model how non–primary care pro-
viders might respond to reductions in demand for their 
services. This implies that our projected cost savings 
may be somewhat overstated.
However, although the exact savings are uncer-
tain, the model projects long-run savings from a per-
manent increase in fees for primary care many times 
larger than the cost of the policy, so our basic conclu-
sions are likely to hold. Moreover, our results are con-
sistent with considerable evidence from both regional 
comparisons within the United States and international 
comparisons, as well as other evidence.15,16
Another limitation of our model is that it does 
not address the precise mechanism by which primary 
care services would increase as a result of higher fees, 
or the amount of time needed for the full impact to 
occur. Some adaptations might occur quickly (such as 
substitution of E&M visits for other services), while 
others would take longer (an increase in the supply of 
primary care providers).17
While the results of simulation models are 
never definitive, policymakers must often rely on such 
analytical tools when direct evidence from comparable 
policy interventions is not available. Without such 
models, isolating and predicting the effects of specific 
policy changes is often impossible. While imperfect, 
the alternative—policymaking without benefit of any 
evidence—would be worse.18
Despite other provisions in the Affordable Care 
Act that could complement the fee increase for primary 
care, further payment reforms are an important compo-
nent of redesigning the health care system to become 
more primary care–oriented and efficient.19 Moving 
away from fee-for-service reimbursement to well-
designed prospective payments or mixed payment sys-
tems could move the market toward greater efficiency, 
for example. Payments to accountable care organiza-
tions—groups of doctors, hospitals, and other providers 
that coordinate care for Medicare patients—are among 
such reforms. Subsidies and support for physicians 
who offer patient-centered medical homes will improve 
care for many suffering from chronic conditions and 
may reduce long-term costs.
The widespread changes in the health care 
delivery system that these policies are designed to 
encourage will take time. In the nearer term, correct-
ing pricing distortions in the fee-for-service approach 
by linking provider payments to health care value can 
move the system in the right direction.20
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APPENDIX. STUDY DATA AND METHODOLOGY
patient cost-sharing owing to different deductibles and 
coinsurance amounts, and disparities in what differ-
ent classes of providers are paid for identical services. 
Using a variety of techniques outlined in the technical 
appendix, we assigned a common value to each to each 
service—representing total allowed charges, that is, 
total payments that providers received from Medicare, 
patients, and other insurers. Those standardized costs 
were therefore independent of the location where pro-
viders provided services, whether they received extra 
payments (such as indirect medical education pay-
ments to teaching hospitals), and the method of pay-
ment within a class of providers (such as cost-based 
reimbursement for critical-access hospitals, versus 
prospective payments for diagnosis-related groups for 
other hospitals).
We supplemented these claims data with 
another linked CTS Physician Survey–Medicare data 
set with claims from 2000 and 2005 in which non–
pediatrician physicians were the unit of observation 
(N=13,707). We used this data set to estimate how phy-
sicians would respond to higher payments for primary 
care services and other physician services. This data 
set and the methods used to estimate these models are 
described in greater detail elsewhere.iii
SIMULATION METHODS
Our simulation aimed to measure the impact of rais-
ing fees for ambulatory E&M visits relative to fees for 
other physician services, in isolation from other com-
ponents of health care reform and overall changes to 
the Medicare fee schedule. We simulated a 10 percent 
increase in fees for ambulatory E&M visits for primary 
care physicians and allied health professionals. Our 
fee increase was similar to the temporary one under 
the Affordable Care Act, although data constraints 
prevented us from replicating the criterion that only 
iii Hadley et al., “Medicare Fees and the Volume of 
Physicians’ Services,” 2010.
DATA
Our study used three years of paid Medicare claims for 
some 2.7 million elderly beneficiaries enrolled in the 
traditional fee-for-service program who did not have 
end-stage kidney disease. These elders had at least one 
contact from 2004 to 2006 with any of 5,554 physi-
cians who treated Medicare patients and responded 
to the 2004–2005 Community Tracking Study (CTS) 
Physician Survey, conducted by the Center for 
Studying Health System Change. The CTS Physician 
Survey uses a sample that is representative of nonfed-
eral physicians practicing in the continental United 
States who provide 20 or more hours of direct patient 
care per week (N=6,627).
Physicians were sampled from 60 nationally 
representative communities.i Beneficiary observations 
are weighted by to be nationally representative, although 
the sample is slightly sicker because the sample lacks 
observations on the small percentage of beneficiaries 
without any physician services over the three-year peri-
od.ii Sample characteristics on average per-beneficiary 
Medicare spending and mortality rates closely match 
corresponding federal administrative data.
Medicare payments for services are not a 
good measure of the quantity of services provided, 
because of regional price adjustments, differences in 
i Physicians were sampled from the master files of 
the American Medical Association and American 
Osteopathic Association, which include all licensed phy-
sicians. Physicians without regular direct patient contact 
(such as radiologists, anesthesiologists, and pathologists) 
were excluded. Interviews were conducted by computer-
assisted telephone interviewing. The response rate was 
52.4 percent. More detail is available at http://hschange.
org/CONTENT/888/. The survey was funded by the 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.
ii We weighted the beneficiary observations to account 
for the probability of selection, and omitted about half 
a million beneficiaries who were: 1) not living in the 60 
CTS communities; 2) enrolled in Medicare Advantage 
at any point during the three-year period; or 3) aged into 
Medicare during any given year.
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practices with 60 percent primary care services in the 
prior year qualify for higher payments.
The model makes separate though interrelated 
spending projections from 2007 to 2020 for 19 catego-
ries of services covered under Medicare Part A and Part 
B. A central component of the simulation is the projec-
tion of primary care E&M visits in ambulatory settings, 
including doctors’ offices, nursing homes, and outpa-
tient clinics. This service category is directly affected 
by a one-time 10 percent fee increase beyond the 
assumed annual fee increase for all physician services. 
Predictions from this model also affect predictions for 
the other 18 service categories.
We based predictions for primary care services 
on two parameters: elasticity in the supply of physician 
services with respect to Medicare fees—that is, the per-
centage change in services resulting from a one percent 
increase in fees—and a time trend. These parameters, 
in turn, were based on a two-part general linear physi-
cian supply model.
The first equation, estimated on all sample 
physicians, is a logit function of the probability that a 
physician provides any primary care visits to his or her 
Medicare patients. The second equation, using only 
observations on physicians who provided primary care 
visits, used relative value units (RVUs) for primary 
care visits per treated Medicare beneficiary as the 
dependent variable. Explanatory variables included a 
Medicare fee term, CTS site and year indicators, and a 
measure of the average health status of each physician’s 
Medicare patients (based on the Hierarchical Coexisting 
Condition Model of the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services). For a given physician, the pre-
dicted supply of primary care RVUs per beneficiary is 
the product of predictions from the two equations.iv
Using the 2000/2005 data set, we calculated 
the number of primary care ambulatory E&M services 
(measured by RVUs) per beneficiary for each county 
iv We adapted the Medicare fee variable from one devel-
oped in Hadley et al., “Medicare Fees and the Volume of 
Physicians’ Services,” 2010.
each year.v This variable was entered into the physi-
cian-supply equations for non–primary care physician 
services as a “quasi” cross-price effect. Otherwise, 
estimation of the models for other physician services 
paralleled that of the primary care model. However, 
two elasticities were calculated from each equation 
and entered into the model’s forecasting: supply elas-
ticity with respect to price, and supply elasticity with 
respect to the provision of primary care E&M services 
in ambulatory settings. That allowed us to model the 
impact of changes in primary care provision resulting 
from the fee increase on other physician services.
We used the 2004–2006 claims data set  to 
predict growth in 11 nonphysician service categories 
over time. Mean county/year costs per beneficiary 
were calculated for each of these categories (N=740).vi 
We constructed county/year–level variables from the 
60 CTS sites that measured the percentage change in 
RVUs per beneficiary for each of the 19 service cat-
egories. We then estimated 11 ordinary least-squares 
regression equations (one for each of the nonphysician 
service categories) in which the percentage change in 
nonphysician utilization within a category from one 
year to the next was estimated as a function of the cor-
responding percentage change in utilization in primary 
care visits as well as the percentage change in utiliza-
tion in each of the other seven physician categories. 
Parameters from these 11 models, along with projec-
tions for the eight physician services categories, were 
then used to make projections for the nonphysician 
service categories.
A key feature of this model is that it allows 
predictions of growth in ambulatory primary care 
E&M services to influence growth in each of the other 
18 service-category prediction equations. In mak-
ing predictions, we assumed that other factors, such 
v The sample was restricted to beneficiaries from the 60 
nationally representative local market areas where the 
CTS sampled physicians, so adequate observations were 
available in each county.
vi The 11 nonphysician categories include some physi-
cian services—specifically those provided by radiolo-
gists, anesthesiologists, and pathologists, who were not 
included in the CTS Physician Survey.
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as annual updates in Medicare fees and inflation in 
the price of inputs to health care (measured by the 
Medicare Economic Index), would continue at average 
rates from the past decade.vii These assumptions, while 
influencing how quickly Medicare costs are projected 
to grow in our baseline model, do not affect the basic 
analytic question of how increasing fees for primary 
care relative to other services will affect total costs. We 
express our model results in inflation-adjusted 2010 
dollars. (See Exhibit A1 for a schematic of the simula-
tion model, and the technical appendix, available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/
Publications/Issue%20Brief/2012/Mar/Reschovsky_
technical_appendices_FINAL.pdf, for a more detailed 
description.)
vii Our model differs in this regard from models of the 
Congressional Budget Office and the Office of the 
Actuary of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services, which must assume that the “sustainable growth 
rate” will continue without congressional overrides. By 
putting our model into inflation-adjusted terms, we treat 
the 10 percent nominal fee increase as a 7.6 percent 
increase in inflation-adjusted terms.
THE POLICY INTERVENTION
Our model provides two sets of projections: a “base-
line” projection that assumes no extra fee increase for 
primary care relative to other services, and a “policy” 
projection that incorporates the 10 percent fee increase 
for primary care E&M visits. Reflecting the Affordable 
Care Act, we assumed that the 10 percent fee increase 
for primary care visits took effect in January 2011, with 
annual updates in later years equal to those assigned to 
other physician services.
Our estimated elasticities in physician services 
in response to changes in fees should be regarded as 
long-run responses. Hence, our model does not identify 
the precise mechanisms spurring changes in the sup-
ply of primary care E&M visits (such as changes in 
the number of providers, or greater use of physician 
extenders), or the length of time needed for effects to 
be fully realized. However, we assume that the full 
impact of the policy will occur by 2020, and for con-
venience that the percentage growth in service use is 
constant over the 10-year period. The long-run impact 
of the policy intervention is insensitive to assump-
tions about the time period or path required for the full 
effects to occur.
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Exhibit A1. Schematic of HSC-CMWF Medicare Simulation Model
Primary care evaluation 
and management visits in 
ambulatory settings
Other physician service 
categories (7 categories)
Nonphysician service 
categories (11 categories)
Assumptions: • Baseline model: Fee 
updates based on historic 
averages
• Policy model: 2011 10% 
primary care fee increase 
• Time trends benchmarked 
to historic trends 
• Fee updates based on 
historic averages
• Time trends benchmarked 
to historic trends
2-Part GLM Model:
1. Prob. Service Provided
2. #RVUs/bene. | provision 
1. Supply elasticity with 
respect to Medicare fees
2. Time trends 
2-Part GLM Model:
1. Prob. Service Provided
2. #RVUs/bene. | provision 
1. Supply elasticity with 
respect to Medicare fees
2. Supply elasticity with 
respect to primary care E&M 
costs per bene.
3. Time trends
County/year level OLS model:
%∆ Nonphysician RVUs/benet 
= f(% ∆ physician category 
standardized costs / bene.it,), 
where i=1-8
Parameters relating growth 
in nonphysician services to 
growth in physician service 
category costs
Nonphysician service category 
standardized costs/bene.
Other physician category 
standardized costs/bene.
Total costs (sum of 19 
predictions)
Primary care E&M standardized 
costs/bene.
•  Relationships stable over 
time
•  Fee updates based on 
historic averages
Estimation:
Parameters:
Predictions:
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